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Abstract
The following paper focuses on the operational safety issues in the aircraft ground handling process. Ground
handling is a critical phase in terms of operational safety, however, severe injuries or even fatal accidents are
rare. According to the available data, during a handling process a quite large number of incidents have as an
outcome a damaged aircraft, which slows down the following processes and fluency of the relevant procedures.
The financial costs in case of even the slightest damage are significantly high.
In order to implement different approach to safety management of ground handling companies, firstly a process
analysis was performed using the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) model. The STAMP
model offers a different approach to operational safety as opposed to a traditional approach. STAMP approaches
failure as a control error. The individual processes are designed for possible future STPA analysis.
The processes were modelled according to the publicly available sources, and further improved with the expertise
and experience from a real operation. A list of potential deviations is added to the processes or individual
activities. Coordination processes between the ground handling company and the airport were also discussed.
An operational measure designed to increase operational safety is proposed for selected cases.
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1. Introduction
This article describes the issues of safety in the process of
ground handling operation. These processes are carried out in
a specific area of the airport. Usually, there is a large number
of personnel and equipment around the aircraft, which are in
some cases very close to the fuselage of the aircraft.
In this context, the aim of this paper is to show how the
current approach to operational safety could be positively in-
fluenced. The airport, as the owner, provides its infrastructure
to the external organizations operating at the airport. The
airport should have at least a basic awareness of the processes
taking place on this infrastructure. Such approach enables a
creation of the general overview of the processes performed
by the external organizations and provides strong foundations
for their monitoring and management done by the airport.
The reason for this lays in a fact that airport is responsible
for the operational safety within its premises, so it is interested
in effective management and influencing of the safety related
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processes. As an effective tool in this approach the model
STAMP [1] emerges as an interesting solution.
STAMP is a model that is used today in many industries
and companies. STAMP enables easy description of the sys-
tem’s control structure and supports the idea of the establish-
ment of the functioning control mechanism. It is created in
a way, which enables monitoring and implementation of the
safety measures on the spot that show irregularities. This is
just one of the application of the created model, which is also
extended through various tools developed on its basis such as
tool STPA [2] (System-Theoretic Process analysis) used in the
early phases of the system development for hazard analysis or
STECA (System-Theoretic Early Concept Analysis) [3].
In this research the focus was placed on the ground han-
dling processes, which are taking place at the airport. It tries
to identify and manage the processes in which cooperation
between the airports is crucial for flawless functioning of
the system. Particular processes were modelled in the block-
schematics, representing workflows with the clearly given
responsibilities and roles. These models are prepared using
the publically available documents dealing with the ground
handling procedures and good practices, such as IATA man-
uals or Ground Operation Manuals of the individual airlines.
It is important to highlight the fact that given processes are
not adjusted to the specific conditions and environment of
one existing airport, but were prepared as a globally accepted
description of the ideal process, applicable anywhere.
Process models are considered as good starting materials
for the new approach on which the potentially future analysis
according to STPA tool could be easily performed without
extensively deep knowledge of the investigated system. The
whole approach is based on the defined deviations from the
ideal process, which represent a dynamic list of potential
irregularities, possibly leading to the safety event. The paper
also discuss implementation of the possible safety measures
based on a previously set deviation lists.
2. Current approach to airport safety
management
The safety management system (SMS) provides framework
and guidance for managing operational safety. The SMS
manual [4] sets out the recommended minimum standard that
shall be applied throughout companies functioning in the
aviation industry. SMS is a systematic, precise and proactive
process for managing safety risks. Full implementation will
help proactively, reactively and predictively controlling risks
to a level that is acceptable in the given conditions.
SMS is a content of Annex 19 [5] and The Doc. 9859
provides guidance material for the establishment of SMS
requirements [4]. From the airport authority point of view,
a ground handling company is one of the several subjects
providing services at the airport. Having this situation, an
airport has an intention to be familiar with the safety related
processes of the external subjects.
Currently, airport has only passive approach to the man-
agement of the safety issues related to the external companies.
This approach is given through the mechanism of the basic
SMS elements:
1. Safety policy and goals
2. Risk management
3. Safety Assurance
4. Safety promotion
These however do not enable active role in the systematic
approach to the process management. For those purposes,
proposed approach supports creation of the high-level picture
covering all coordination processes and sharing of the relevant
data. This is a main reason, why this model was evaluated as
adequate, taking into consideration its system-theory founda-
tion and focus, which is placed on the definition of the system
level hazards.
3. Process modelling and following
hazard analysis principles
During the research phase, several processes were modelled
according to their relevancy and priority. Firstly, the goal was
to create a model of the current state, with all included entities,
roles, responsibilities and control structure. Currently existing
processes are now designed according to the principles of
STAMP, however, internal control processes were analysed
and used for the initial definition of the process deviations.
The following Figure 1 show a process of approaching the
aircraft, after full stop at the stand.
Individual process steps were described with the clearly
stated activity, responsible entity and workflow. Each step was
defined in a way that control loops from the STAMP model
were specified for all of them. Failure of the particular control
structure element is considered to be a deviation from the
designed process.
On the previous figure 1, these deviation were defined for
all process steps in a form of deviation list located next to
the particular blocks in the schema. These represent detailed
analysis of the process, which is basically a guideline for the
safety expert performing an analysis or investigation. It is
a question, whether these could be evaluated as hazards. It
up to the safety expert on which level of detail will perform
investigation and hazard analysis. STAMP and STPA take
into consideration only system-level hazards.
In order to be in line with the STAMP and STPA principles,
these deviation should be used as a control structure deviation
descriptions and guidelines for extensive hazard identification.
4. Internal processes coordination
The airport has a specific structure with many sources of po-
tential hazards. Therefore, monitoring of the ground handling
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Figure 1. Model of a process – approaching the aircraft after
full stop at the stand (source: author)
processes should be a very important part of the SMS. Thus,
SMS is directly concerned with ground handling processes,
given the number of potential hazards arising from them. The
high level of safety culture and its promotion among employ-
ees has a major impact on successful safety management.
Having several organizations involved into one process
brings a responsibility overlapping, which is not an exception
in terms of safety. Airport and ground handling should have
clearly given and coordinated safety mechanisms, functioning
as one integrated end effective element. This integration and
more proactive interconnections between organizations are
represented in the following example. It is important to high-
light, that coordination processes exists in the current systems,
however, their utilization is only at the operational level.
4.1 Process - Aircraft arrival
After receiving an arrival assignment, the TCO will arrive at
the assigned parking stand with a sufficient time to ensure
that the stand is clear of all obstacles and equipment and that
aircraft has unimpeded access to its final parking position.
Prior to aircraft arrival, the team leader shall ensure that the
following is available and serviceable at the arrival stand.
1. GSE
2. Chocks and Safety cones
3. Ground power source
4. Preconditioned air (if applicable)
Team leader must conduct pre-arrival briefing and allo-
cate the assignments and responsibilities for the turnaround
operation. This process should also ensure that all required
staff are present and all required GSE is available and service-
able, positioned outside of ERA (Equipment Restraint Area).
The team leader or designated person must ensure the crew
involved in the operation understand and come to agreement
with how the communication will be performed and how the
aircraft will be handled.
The stand should also be checked for any FOD that is evi-
dent especially around the area to be occupied by the aircraft
landing gears and engine intakes. Upon aircraft arrival, chocks
and cones shall be positioned and the TCO is required to per-
form an aircraft arrival inspection for any aircraft damage.
This shall be conducted prior to approach of any equipment,
including all GSE and Passenger Boarding Bridge (Jetty).
Minimum arrival aircraft inspection shall consist of the fol-
lowing:
1. All cargo doors
2. All access panels and servicing access points
3. Aircraft fuselage
4. Aircraft engine cowlings
5. Aircraft passenger doors
As an example here, a FOD removal will be used. The
ramp agent, or other responsible person, performs the check,
whether the aircraft stand is free of any obstacles or objects
that could cause damage to the aircraft, while approaching
the parking position. In the case of FOD detection, which
could endanger a safe movement of the aircraft or the safe
performance of the ground handling processes, the person in
charge must remove the object outside the given area with a
minimum delay.
If an obstacle is not possible to remove by the ground
handling personnel or if a longer period of time is needed, or it
is not the responsibility of the ground personnel to remove the
FOD, and it is likely that the obstacle will not be removed prior
to the arrival of the aircraft, ramp agent must inform the airport
central operation dispatch, which will decide, if necessary, to
allocate another airport stand for the flight. In this case, the
central operation dispatch must inform the ground handling
service provider immediately.
5. Practical safety measures based on
created safety model
In a dynamic airport environment, where the change of arrival
time or last-minute change of stand is done on daily basis, it
is difficult for the ground handling organization to scheduled
turn-around coordinators at the right time. And therefore, it is
not always possible to reach the TCO with sufficient time to
perform all the tasks before arrival of the aircraft. For practical
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Figure 2. Model of the process – FOD removal (source:
author)
presentation, one of the defined deviations could be analysed
and safety measure explained.
One of the safety measures, with the high probability for
process efficiency increase is a radar or scanner device, which
provides automatic FOD check. Application of such device
changes internal structure of the existing control mechanism
through a reduction of the several control loops and imple-
mentation of the automated sensors and actuators.
The device in this context would represent integrated part
of VDGS (visual docking guidance system). Its basic activity
is started before the aircraft reach the stand. In case of late
arrival of TCO on the stand and inability to perform FOD
(Foreign object debris) check, the device is capable of FOD
recognition and sharing of the positive finding message with
the crew of an aircraft. The signal for the crew will be in a
form of indication STOP on the display of VDGS.
Such system showed good results in revealing larger ob-
jects that are left on the stand, such as dollies, conveyor belts
or other GSE (ground service equipment). From the practical
stand point, one of the disadvantages that should be taken into
considerations are technical issues for their utilization in a
case of remote stands or other open aprons without supporting
pylons or other fixed infrastructure. It would be also difficult
to set up such sensitivity to reveal miniature objects, such as a
screw or baggage lock.
6. Limitations
It should be highlighted that the process maps are not mod-
elled for the particular airport or airline. The maps are based
on IATA guidance materials and good practices [6, 7], which
have defined the basic rules for the ground handling processes,
in order to be performed safely, using current technology.
Process maps can only be used as some kind of global back-
ground (globally acceptable solution), but not as material
corresponding with a particular airport conditions. The local
conditions of a given airport, such as stand design, airport
infrastructure or meteorological conditions, are not applied
and should be implemented during system design phase of the
process change. In case of the airlines, this organizations may
have their specific requirements based on service experience,
which may be different in comparison with IGOM [6].
7. Conclusion
The article describes particular ground handling processes
through their modelling. For every modelled process step
a list of deviations is defined. Deviation in this context is
understood as a practical drift from the process as designed.
These represent a guidelines for the investigation process in
the systems, where no sufficient operational data are available
and as a support for the preparation of the safety studies on the
existing and new systems. Model respects STAMP principles
and it is based on the control structure management.
Deviation in this context represent expected possible is-
sues with the control mechanism, which is defined for all
control loops. Due to a fact that this mechanism is defined
on the existing, fully functioning system, this approach was
evaluated as the most efficient. Potential optimization of the
defined control structure is expected, after operational data
analysis and evaluation of the acceptance of the system ro-
bustness and structure as it is given currently.
Analysis also highlighted the processes in which coordi-
nation between ground handling company and airport takes
place. This is particularly important, because one of the ba-
sic principles of the STAMP is that only system level hazard
should be a subject of hazard identification. In such com-
plex systems, where responsibilities of the several entities
overlap, it is important to establish functioning and effective
management system with the system-level hazards identified
and understood by all included parties.
Paper also brings a proposal of technological or process
changes that would help to set up system and implement safety
measures within the process. The process maps were defined
with the intention of future use for complete STPA analy-
sis. An analysis of possible measures based on a previously
set hazard lists was performed according to the modelled
processes. A validation method was recommended for each
proposal.
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